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We aim to establish the following claim: other factors held constant, the relative weights of the 
epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient 
surrogates pursue. Simply put, surrogates confront an incentive, ceteris paribus, to pursue 
treatment options with respect to which their knowledge is most adequate to the requirements of 
the case. Regardless of what the patient would choose, options that require more knowledge than 
the surrogate possesses (or is likely to learn) will either be neglected altogether or deeply 
discounted in the surrogate’s incentive structure. We establish this claim by arguing that the 
relation between epistemic burdens and incentives in decision-making is a general feature of 
surrogate decision-making. After establishing the claim, we draw out some of the implications 
for surrogate decision-making in medicine and offer philosophical and psychological 
explanations of the phenomenon. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to relevant medical-ethical standards, patient surrogates, those who make 
medical decisions for patients unable to make such decisions for themselves, ought to base their 
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decisions on what they think the patient would want, if she could express such a preference.1 It is 
often the case, however, that this standard can be met only if the surrogate first overcomes her 
ignorance of various considerations. These include, first, that the surrogate may be ignorant of 
the patient’s values, beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions. When we make our own medical 
decisions, we don’t need to think about what kind of person we are. If she is to meet the relevant 
standard, however, a surrogate must possess intimate knowledge of the patient’s values, beliefs, 
etc. This knowledge may be difficult to acquire.2 Second, the surrogate may be ignorant of what 
the patient would want in the context under consideration, i.e., the surrogate may not know what 
the patient’s values, beliefs, etc., imply about the decision she would want made under prevailing 
circumstances. When we make our own medical decisions, we make them in the context of our 
own lives and how we want to live them. For surrogates, however, this deliberation, must be 
more explicit in order to make a decision that meets the relevant standard. Third, the surrogate 
may be ignorant of some of the medical facts knowledge of which is required to meet the 
standard of deciding as the patient would decide. If there is a disconnect between what the 
surrogate and the patient know about pertinent medical facts, there is likely to be a disconnect 
between the surrogate’s decision and the patient’s unexpressed preference.  
Scheall defines the epistemic burden of some objective as “simply everything that one 
must know…which one does not already know, in order to realize [the objective] deliberately as 
                                                        
1 The substituted judgment standard is widely accepted in medical ethics as the primary standard 
of surrogate decision-making. Some may prefer instead the best interests standard, whereby the 
surrogate makes decisions according to what she thinks the patient’s interests are. These 
standards have been thoroughly adjudicated throughout the medical ethics literature. But readers 
will notice that whether the appropriate standard is substituted judgment or best interest has little 
bearing on whether our argument is sound. 
 
2 We mean ‘knowledge’ to refer to both knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Lacking either of 
these types of knowledge implies that one is ignorant of that proposition or of that skill—
ignorance is not limited to ignorance of propositions. 
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a result of related actions directed to its realization” (Scheall, forthcoming). In any particular 
case, the patient surrogate’s epistemic burden is everything that she needs to know, which she 
does not already know, in order to purposefully make the decision that the patient would want to 
be made, if she could express a preference. The range of things with respect to which a surrogate 
may be ignorant is potentially wide. A person may be ignorant of relevant facts or propositions, 
lack practical knowledge relating to required skills, be ignorant of what another person’s 
interests or preferences are, or lack knowledge of the potential consequences, however likely, of 
a particular action. All of these instances of ignorance could potentially figure into a person’s 
epistemic burden, as overcoming this ignorance may be necessary to realize her objective. 
Much has been written on the reliability of surrogates and their ability to make medical 
decisions (Berger et al., 2008; Moorman and Carr, 2008; Shalowitz DI, Garrett-Mayer E and 
Wendler D, 2006; Suhl J et al., 1994). That surrogates face significant epistemic difficulties is 
not a novel point (Brudney, 2018; Buchanan and Brock, 1989; Pope, 2012). What has not yet 
been recognized in the literature is the crucial role that epistemic burdens play in shaping the 
incentives that surrogates confront to choose various treatment options and, thus, insofar as 
incentives determine decisions,3 the role of epistemic burdens in determining the decision that 
surrogates ultimately make.4 That epistemic burdens shape incentives is true for all decisions, 
personal and surrogate. But, given the greater likelihood of the decision-maker’s ignorance of the 
                                                        
3 Our use of ‘determine’ is compatible with any of the popular theories of causation. The truth of 
our claim does not hinge on any particular theory of causation. Also, the word ‘incentive’ is used 
in the paper in its well-understood sense, especially as commonly used in economics and the 
social sciences. That incentives play a causal role in decision-making is common currency across 
the social sciences. 
4 Kibbe and Ford’s (2016) concluding qualification approaches our point, but nevertheless stops 
well short.  
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important considerations described above, epistemic burdens are especially pertinent wherever a 
surrogate decides on behalf, and ostensibly in the interests, of a patient.  
We aim to establish one claim: other factors held constant, the relative weights of the 
epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient 
surrogates pursue. Simply put, surrogates confront an incentive, ceteris paribus, to pursue 
treatment options with respect to which their knowledge (or their potential for learning) is most 
adequate to the requirements of the case. Regardless of what the patient, who confronts either a 
lighter epistemic burden or none at all, would choose, options that require more knowledge than 
the surrogate possesses (or is likely to learn) will either be neglected altogether or deeply 
discounted in her incentive structure. If, relative to other treatment options, the surrogate is less 
knowledgeable of the significance of the patient’s preferred treatment for the patient’s values, 
beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions, or of the significance of the treatment for the patient under 
prevailing circumstances, then the patient’s preferred option will either be ignored entirely or 
ranked relatively lower in the surrogate’s incentive structure. Other things equal, the surrogate 
will likely not choose the patient’s preferred treatment option and the relevant medical-ethical 
standard will go unmet. Importantly, however, it will go unmet for epistemic, rather than moral, 
reasons. 
Burdens of any kind, epistemic or otherwise, shape incentives. For example, suppose that 
before you are two paths, equally long and winding, that reach the same destination. However, 
while the path on the right is free of obstacles, the path on the left has across it a large wall that, 
were you to choose that path, would require you to get over it. This obstacle—a burden that must 
be overcome in order to travel effectively on this path—disincents taking the left path, and, 
conversely, incents taking the right path. Epistemic burdens influence incentives similarly. Our 
ignorance is a burden that must be overcome in order to realize certain objectives.  
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When there are competing options, their comparative epistemic burdens shape the 
incentives the actor faces to pursue different options. That is, the extent to which the epistemic 
burden of a particular option incents or disincents the option is relative to the burdens of the 
other options, but the epistemic burdens of the various options themselves are independent of 
each other. You may find that learning Russian is more burdensome than learning French and 
this may inform your decision to learn French, but the burden that you confront in achieving 
French fluency is independent of the burden to be overcome in order to master Russian. More 
generally, given some subject S and options O1 and O2, the epistemic burden that S confronts in 
attempting to realize option O1 is independent of the epistemic burden that S confronts in attempting to 
realize option O2. This is true whether S is choosing between learning Russian rather than French, 
deciding which policy to adopt in order to most positively impact the lives of one’s constituents, or 
choosing whether to continue or discontinue aggressive treatment for an incapacitated loved one. The 
ease or difficulty that S confronts in acquiring the knowledge (that and how) necessary to realize O1 
cannot be affected by the ease or difficulty that S confronts in acquiring the knowledge (that and how) 
necessary to realize O2. The burdens of each option just are what they are—they do not depend on each 
other in any way. 
What is dependent on the relative weight of the epistemic burdens of competing options is the 
ranking of these options in S’s incentive structure. In effect, a subject’s epistemic burden with respect to 
some option is the epistemic distance (if you will) separating the subject at that moment in time from 
realization of the option. Just as the physical distance separating a subject at any given moment from 
some physical location (say, Los Angeles) is not affected by the physical distance separating the same 
subject at the same moment from some other physical location (say, New York City), the epistemic 
distance that a subject needs to travel to realize option O1 is not affected by the epistemic distance that 
the same subject needs to travel to realize some other option O2.  Of course, the distance separating the 
subject from Los Angeles relative to the distance separating the subject from New York City might make 
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one or the other a more attractive travel destination, but the actual distances do not depend on each other. 
Epistemic burdens work the same way.5  
Epistemic burdens play a role in determining the menu of options from which a person 
chooses and, thus, the option that she ultimately pursues. The scope of things that epistemic 
burdens determine may be wider than this, but we take no stance on this question. Nothing in our 
argument hinges on the possibility that epistemic burdens play a broader causal role in decision-
making. In our view, following Scheall (forthcoming), the menu of options from which a person 
chooses in any given decision context has been pre-filtered on some (often, less-than-conscious) 
level for her ignorance. That is, options that are judged to bear an impossible epistemic burden 
are typically excluded from the menu and options judged to bear relatively heavy epistemic 
burdens are commensurately discounted in the menu. Epistemic burdens serve to determine 
where an option appears, if it appears at all, in a person’s initial preference ranking (i.e., 
“incentive structure”). It is only once this pre-filtering for ignorance has occurred, we contend 
that a decision can ultimately be determined by considering the remaining menu options in light 
of other factors (moral, political, economic, what have you). Thus, our claim is that epistemic 
burdens serve to determine what a person is incented to do and not do, and, thus, insofar as 
incentives determine decisions, epistemic burdens serve to determine decisions as well.  
We contend that this priority of the epistemic is a feature of all decision-making, personal 
and surrogate. It is more obvious, however, in the case of surrogate decision-making. A sane 
person, whose possible courses of action in a particular context have been pre-filtered for her 
ignorance, will never find an epistemically impossible option in her menu. But there is no such 
                                                        
5 The argument is not materially affected even if the knowledge required to realize O1 is a subset 
of the knowledge required to realize O2, such that overcoming the epistemic burden of the latter 
requires overcoming the epistemic burden of the former. If our argument is sound, it remains the 
case that the relative epistemic burdens of the two options will affect how attractive they are to 
the subject and, thus, their placement in the subject’s initial incentive structure. 
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guarantee in cases of surrogate decision-making. A patient surrogate tasked with doing what an 
incapacitated patient would want, were the patient capable of expressing a preference, may find 
it is epistemically impossible either to discover this preference or to realize it.   
In the next section we draw from work that establishes an analogous thesis for 
policymakers, who are another type of surrogate decision-maker (Scheall, forthcoming). In the 
section that follows, we transpose this argument to patient surrogates. Whether the surrogates are 
family members, guardians, or physicians, they all confront heavy epistemic burdens that shape 
their incentives. Once we establish this phenomenon, we offer two explanations for it, one 
philosophical and one psychological.  
 
EPISTEMIC BURDENS OF POLICYMAKERS 
 
Policymakers are surrogate decision-makers—they decide on public policy on behalf, and 
ostensibly in the interests, of their constituents. Scheall considers the various factors that 
determine the extent to which policymakers pursue objectives that constituents demand. He 
makes no assumption about the manner, democratic or otherwise, in which policymakers achieve 
their positions in the imagined state of his model. Instead, he assumes that there is a widely-held 
belief among the general public, including among constituents, that policymakers ought to 
pursue their constituents’ policy preferences. Thus, our present concern with the factors that 
determine the extent to which a surrogate acts according to the patient’s wishes is analogous to 
Scheall’s concern with the factors that determine the extent to which policymakers act on their 
constituent’s policy demands. There is also a parallel in the assumption that policymakers ought 
to pursue their constituents’ preferences and the medical-ethical standards relevant to patient 
surrogacy.  
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Scheall starts from the simplifying assumption that policymakers know the objectives 
that their constituents want them to pursue. By assumption, the policymaker faces an epistemic 
burden only in discovering the means to realize various policy objectives. This assumption is 
rather unique as simplifying assumptions go, because weakening it or dropping it altogether 
would seemingly bolster Scheall’s ultimate conclusion: the heavier the epistemic burden 
involved in discovering their constituents’ policy demands, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
incentive confronted by policymakers to pursue other objectives. That we make no such 
assumption about a surrogate’s knowledge of the patient’s wishes is a key difference in our 
analysis. Of course, the significance of dropping this assumption is that, ceteris paribus, the 
patient surrogate’s epistemic situation is yet more burdensome than that of Scheall’s idealized 
policymaker, who knows her constituents’ policy demands automatically, without need for a 
potentially burdensome search process. The patient surrogate needs to know not only the means 
to realize the patient’s wishes (i.e., the pertinent medical facts), but must also discover these 
wishes. 
Scheall, Butos, and McQuade argue that the means to selfish ends are often (by no means 
always) more easily known than the means to altruistic goals (Scheall et al., forthcoming). The 
epistemic burden of self-interested policymaking tends to be lighter than that of constituent-
minded policymaking. If this is right, they conclude, “We should expect to find more self-
interested political behavior where (ceteris paribus) the epistemic burden of making effective 
public-minded policy is comparatively heavy” (Scheall et al., forthcoming). Generalizing this 
thesis, Scheall argues that “Other factors held constant, the relative weights of the epistemic 
burdens of competing policy objectives serve to determine the objectives that policymakers 
pursue.” 
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If this is right, then, ceteris paribus, the policymaker is incented to pursue policy 
objectives that bear the lowest epistemic burden, i.e., those goals she knows or has the best 
prospects of learning how to realize. Other factors held constant, the policy objectives that 
constituents demand will be pursued only if they impose a lighter epistemic burden on 
policymakers than alternative policy objectives. Otherwise, the policy objectives that 
constituents demand will be ignored in favor of other policy pursuits (perhaps accompanied by a 
public pretense of the pursuit of constituents’ demands). In short, the nature and extent of her 
ignorance of the means required to realize her constituents’ demands serve to determine the 
extent to which the policymaker pursues constituent-minded rather than other policy objectives. 
The relative epistemic burden of constituent-minded policymaking is a factor that contributes to 
determining how much of it we get. 
One might complain that the use of a ceteris paribus condition trivializes our claim, as in 
politics and medicine ceteris is never paribus. But such a complaint would be mistaken. First, 
ceteris paribus conditions figure in all branches of inquiry across the sciences and humanities. 
Newton’s laws of motion have ceteris paribus conditions attached to them, as do all of the laws 
of the social sciences. Of course, it is no less the case in, say, economics, that other factors are 
not held constant. Yet, the Law of Demand remains in operation: presumably, were the price of 
tea to increase ten-fold, a person who objects to the use of ceteris paribus conditions in scholarly 
inquiry would nevertheless be inclined to buy less tea. Science cannot proceed by considering 
phenomena in their entirety. Rather, science proceeds by considering the effects of one factor or 
of one set of factors, on the phenomenon of interest, while controlling other factors as far as 
possible. Second, we invoke the ceteris paribus assumption in order to focus on the effects of 
ignorance on decision-making. It is a simplifying assumption. It is important to note, however, 
that the assumption simplifies not only our epistemic circumstances, but those of the surrogate 
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decision-maker in our model. Dropping the assumption that all other potentially relevant factors 
are being artificially held constant would not necessarily improve the surrogate’s epistemic 
condition and, thus, need not diminish her epistemic burdens or their significance for her 
decisions.    
Among the further implications that Scheall draws from this thesis is the priority in the 
political realm of epistemic to normative considerations, i.e., the priority of questions concerning 
what policymakers know enough to do over questions of what they should do. “The 
policymaker’s knowledge and ignorance serve to determine what policy objectives [she] is 
incented to pursue or to not pursue, but the opposite is not true: that a policymaker is incented to 
some objective is irrelevant to whether [she] possesses or can acquire the knowledge required of 
its realization…Epistemic burdens are factors in the determination of incentives, but incentives 
are irrelevant to epistemic burdens.” Importantly for our purposes, this priority would seem to be 
fully general in decision-making, albeit largely obscured in personal decision-making for the 
reasons mentioned in the previous section. 
To illustrate the point, consider the significance for decision-making of the principle that 
ought implies can.6 We typically apply this principle such that, when we consider what we ought 
to do, our options are pre-sorted for ignorance of relevant factors. We include among our options 
only things that we think we know (or can learn) enough to do. If we do not think that we can 
acquire adequate knowledge to achieve some end, we exclude it from, or deeply discount it in, 
our incentive structure. We either do not consider or do not take seriously options that we think 
                                                        
6 The main thesis does not ultimately hinge on acceptance of this principle, which is not without 
controversy. One might think that a relation weaker than logical implication holds between ought 
and can, and still accept that ignorance shapes our incentive structures. The ought-implies-can 
principle merely illustrates the point in an especially stark way.  
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impossible on the basis of the knowledge we possess or are likely to acquire in the process of 
their pursuit. 
Such deliberations often occur sub-consciously, but occur they surely do. It is not likely to 
occur to someone ignorant of baking that they ought to make a loaf of bread when they find 
flour, water, salt, and yeast in front of them. But put those four ingredients in front of a baker, 
and baking a loaf will appear as an option, albeit perhaps only at a less-than-fully conscious 
level. The difference between the options available to two such people is determined by 
differences in their ignorance. We also typically exclude or discount options that require for their 
realization the substantial intervention of luck or other spontaneous forces. That is, the practical 
meaning of “can” in “ought implies can” is “can deliberately.” Thus, the practical significance of 
the principle, Scheall concludes, is that “ought to X implies can X, which implies knows (or can 
learn) enough to X.”7 It is empty to insist that an actor ought to pursue some end which, because 
she takes herself to be ignorant of pertinent knowledge, will either not appear or appear only as 
deeply discounted in her incentive structure. For instance, suppose that a person is swimming in 
deep water surrounded by circling sharks and that you are standing on a nearby ship next to an 
inflatable life boat, with no other life-saving devices in reach. Unfortunately, the instructions for 
inflation of the life boat are written in Sanskrit. You cannot save the person. There is no course 
of action available to you that will result in the preservation of the swimmer’s life. It is either 
false or simply meaningless to assert that you ought to save the person, because you cannot save 
the person. The epistemic burden that must be overcome in order to save the swimmer is too 
heavy for any person to lift in the time available. As the soon-to-be shark food calls for help, 
                                                        
7 That the significance of “can” in “ought implies can” must be something like “deliberately can” 
follows also from the fact that any other meaning seemingly trivializes the claim. That is, if the 
meaning of “can” in “ought implies can” is something like “possibly can” or “can, with luck,” 
then the principle prohibits no possible (in some undefined sense) course of action. We assume 
that the principle is not trivial.   
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spontaneously learning Sanskrit is not an option and will not occur to you as an option. Your 
ignorance gets you off the moral hook, but only because the epistemic burdens shape the options 
available to you and, in turn, what you can do. 
All of this is to demonstrate that ignorance shapes both options and the incentives associated 
with those options. Ignorance and epistemic burdens serve to determine the menu of options and, 
thus, the option one ultimately chooses. If ought to X ultimately implies that the actor knows 
enough to X, then there can be no normative obligation for the actor to pursue ends the 
realization of which require more, or different, knowledge than she can acquire. If the 
policymaker cannot know enough to realize her constituents’ policy demands, there can be no 
obligation for her to pursue them. If the principle that ought implies can (or some weaker, but 
relevantly similar, principle) is applicable to the ethics of patient surrogacy, then epistemic 
considerations are also prior to normative ones in these contexts. The surrogate must meet her 
epistemic burdens before she can reasonably be expected to satisfy any moral obligation 
associated with her surrogate decision. 
 
EPISTEMIC BURDENS OF PATIENT SURROGATES 
 
 In this section, we aim to establish that patient surrogates occupy an epistemic position 
analogous to that of policymakers. If it is true both that, other factors held constant, the relative 
weights of the epistemic burdens of competing policy objectives serve to determine the objectives 
that policymakers pursue, and that the epistemic position of policymakers is analogous to the 
epistemic position of patient surrogates, then it is also true that, other factors held constant, the 
relative weights of the epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the 
options that patient surrogates pursue.  
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 There are several relevant points of similarity between the epistemic positions of 
policymakers and patient surrogates. First, both policymakers and patient surrogates ostensibly 
make decisions on behalf of their constituents / patients. Their epistemic ends—possession of the 
knowledge necessary to realize the preferences of the persons for whom they decide—are the 
same; yet, both kinds of surrogate decision-maker seem similarly misplaced to possess 
knowledge of these preferences. At least, there is no reason to think in either case that decision-
makers always (perhaps ever) automatically know the content of these preferences without first 
engaging in some sort of learning process.  
It is possible for a surrogate’s own preferences to align with those of her constituents / 
patient, but such alignment should not be assumed. A policymaker’s own personal preferences 
might be most easily satisfied by pursuing her constituents’ policy demands or by merely making 
a public pretense of their pursuit. Similarly, a physician’s preference for providing meaningful 
teaching experiences for her residents may also realize her patient’s preference. A family 
member may benefit from the inheritance that results from her decision to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, but this might also be the decision that best accords with the patient’s 
preferences. In any case, even such alignment of preferences does not ensure knowledge of 
aligned preferences—that a surrogate’s preferences in fact align with those of the person for 
whom they decide is not sufficient for knowledge of this fact. The surrogate always has some 
work to do in order to realize her epistemic ends. 
The problem of knowledge of relevant preferences is quite complex in contexts of 
medical-surrogate decision-making. A physician may have insight into a patient’s medical 
interests, but these are only a subset of the patient’s total interests (including the patient’s interest 
in having her preferences satisfied). Physicians are typically ignorant of those interests that 
outstrip the merely medical, such as a patient’s preference to not be intubated. This is why 
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physicians rely on family and friends of incapacitated patients. These are the people who know 
the patient intimately and can most reliably convey her preferences. But even the most reliable 
sources of a patient’s preferences may be nevertheless unreliable. There are many ways for a 
loved one’s belief about a patient’s preferences to be confounded. There may be no consensus 
about her preferences among a patient’s friends and family. But even supposing that loved ones 
reliably express a patient’s preferences, they may not understand the relation between these 
preferences and available treatment options, or how to express relevant preferences to physicians 
in such a way that the latter proffer fruitful advice.  
Second, beyond ignorance of relevant preferences, both policymakers and patient 
surrogates are often ignorant to some extent of how to achieve relevant goals implied by these 
preferences. We noted above that Scheall assumes policymakers to be fully knowledgeable of 
their constituents’ policy demands. This assumption is made merely for the sake of simplifying 
the analysis. In fact, policymakers are often ignorant of what their constituents want from them. 
They have access to polls that provide limited evidence of these demands, but that are, in any 
case, infamously defeasible. They have anecdotal evidence by way of contact with individual 
voters, extrapolations from which are difficult, indeterminate, and regularly falsified. And they 
may have evidence from historical trends that often change in ways that can only be recognized 
retrospectively.   
While physicians may be able to inform patient surrogates of the relevant treatment 
options, they typically do not act as surrogates themselves. Family and friends may know the 
patient’s preferences, but not how to achieve these preferences, even after the physician has 
informed them of the treatment options available. For example, surrogates may justifiably 
believe that the patient’s preferences are best served by attempting to preserve life at all costs, 
but they might be ignorant of the violence and invasiveness required to serve these preferences. 
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This ignorance is often barely mitigated by the physician informing them of this violence and 
invasiveness, which is more persuasively felt than merely spoken of. Or surrogates might think 
that the patient’s preferences are best served by bringing her home to die (relatively) peacefully 
under hospice care, but they may be ignorant of some of what is required to respect these 
preferences, such as the steps necessary to ensure medical stability while the patient is 
transported. So, although patient surrogates may be in the best position to express the patient’s 
preferences, they may be ignorant of how to achieve them. Conversely, physicians may be 
knowledgeable of how to achieve patient preferences insofar as they know them, but not know 
them very well. Effective communication between physician and surrogate can partially repair 
both parties’ ignorance, but never so much that the surrogate’s epistemic burden is reduced to the 
level of a capacitated patient able to make her own medical decisions. The surrogate’s epistemic 
burdens will always be greater. 
Policymakers and patient surrogates occupy similar epistemic positions: they are 
frequently ignorant of either relevant constituent / patient preferences or how to achieve them. 
Realizing their ostensible obligations requires overcoming their epistemic burdens. If it is true of 
policymakers that these epistemic burdens shape their incentives, then it is also true of patient 
surrogates. Other factors held constant, the relative weights of the epistemic burdens of 
competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient surrogates pursue. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Epistemic burdens are likely to differ depending on whether the patient surrogate is a 
loved one or a physician. As surrogates, family members and friends are likely to confront 
heavier epistemic burdens in understanding the relevant medical circumstances and translating 
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their knowledge, such as it is, of the patient’s preferences into effective treatment. These burdens 
might be partially met in cases where the causal mechanism underlying the patient’s condition is 
relatively simple and, thus, comparatively easy to understand, or by a physician filling in some of 
the missing knowledge. But, assuming that patient surrogates without medical expertise confront 
their greatest epistemic burdens in overcoming ignorance of relevant medical facts and in 
translating these facts into a treatment conducive to the patient’s preferences, the path of least 
epistemic resistance is likely to flow around, rather than through, this ignorance. Assuming other 
relevant factors are equal across treatment options, friends and family members acting as patient 
surrogates will pursue treatment options that are epistemically easier, i.e., those that are already 
understood or are relatively easy to understand. 
Of course, treatment options might vary along any number of different, non-epistemic, 
dimensions. These dimensions may include the likelihood of realizing the patient’s preferences, 
financial cost, severity of the patient’s pain or the length of time the patient must spend in pain, 
or the physician’s time and effort. It is rarely the case that other relevant factors are truly equal 
across treatment options. But this does not mean that epistemic burdens do not shape a 
surrogate’s incentives.  
Suppose that a surrogate justifiably believes that the patient would not want to be 
permanently dependent on life-sustaining technology, but is ignorant whether the patient would 
prefer short-term dependence with a small chance of recovery to withdrawal of treatment and 
likely death. Further suppose that the recommended treatment leading to the greatest likelihood 
of recovery requires a tracheostomy and a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy, followed by 
transfer to a long-term acute-care facility for multiple months. The alternative is withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment and likely death in the near-term. There are significant epistemic 
burdens in this case that shape the surrogate’s incentives. The first option requires that the 
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surrogate understand not only the medical facts associated with the treatment, but also how the 
treatment integrates with their existing beliefs about the patient’s preferences. The second option 
requires less understanding of the relevant medical facts—relative to the consequences of the 
treatment option, death is a comparatively stark and easily understood result—but still requires 
that the surrogate understand these consequences in light of her knowledge of the patient’s 
preferences. The epistemic burdens of the two options may be different, but so too are the values 
with which they intersect. The first option requires the patient to bear greater physical pain, as 
recovery from the treatment involves significant physical and emotional suffering. It will also be 
more expensive. But its greatest potential cost may be a possible violation of the patient’s 
dignity, if treatment is contrary to her preferences. Of course, given that the second option leads 
to likely death, the potential costs associated with it might be even greater.  
Our point is simply that the relative epistemic burdens of the two options will be a 
significant factor in determining how the surrogate evaluates them. That the first requires 
epistemic work (e.g., knowing what is involved in being dependent upon tracheostomy and 
ventilator, or extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, or long-term dialysis, etc.) that the second 
does not is relevant to where the options will appear in the surrogate’s incentive structure. 
Whether the surrogate explicitly considers them or not, the epistemic burdens she must confront 
in pursuing various options will guide her decision-making. When other factors are not equal 
across options, the relative epistemic burdens of competing options may or may not be the 
deciding factor, but when ceteris is paribus, the relative weights of competing epistemic burdens 
will determine the option that the surrogate selects. 
Qua surrogate, a physician is likely to confront a heavier epistemic burden in discovering 
the patient’s preferences than in knowing the medical facts or in determining an effective 
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treatment given knowledge of relevant preferences and facts.8 When a physician acts as a 
surrogate, it typically means that there is no one else able and willing to fill the role. In such 
cases, the attending physician is likely to be especially ignorant of the patient’s preferences, 
though perhaps knowledgeable of how to satisfy a range of interests once these are determined. 
When other factors are constant across treatment options, the physician will pursue the least 
epistemically burdensome option.  
Suppose an incapacitated patient is unrepresented by a surrogate, so that the physician 
must make all medical decisions. Suppose also that the patient is terminally ill. One option is to 
continue aggressive treatment with the aim of prolonging life. The other option is to focus on 
comfort and palliation at the end of life. The physician knows how to achieve these goals. What 
the physician doesn’t know is which option best satisfies the patient’s preferences, because this 
information is not available—the patient is unrepresented. Whether the physician chooses 
aggressive treatment or palliation is partly dependent on the relative weights of their respective 
epistemic burdens. The default assumption in such cases is often that a patient wants to continue 
to live. To overcome this assumption—to know that the patient prefers the second option—the 
physician requires evidence of the patient’s preference for comfort over continued life. Thus, 
under these circumstances, the epistemic burden of palliative treatment is weightier and, if other 
relevant factors are equal, the treatment option that the physician will avoid. With more 
information, however, the physician’s epistemic burdens may shift in such a way that palliation 
becomes the more attractive option. Suppose that a friend of the patient—someone with limited 
knowledge of the patient’s interests, but who is otherwise unable to make decisions for the 
patient—reveals that the patient valued her personal independence above all else. This new 
                                                        
8 If one prefers the language of know-how and know-that, the physician is more likely to lack 
knowledge that the patient’s preferences are X, rather than to lack knowledge of how to achieve 
a particular medical goal. 
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information repairs some of the physician’s ignorance of the patient’s preferences, lowering the 
epistemic burden associated with choosing palliation (i.e., the treatment associated with less 
dependence on life-sustaining technology). 
 As a final example, consider advanced directives, or other types of documentation that a 
patient might compose to indicate their preferences for medical treatment in the event they are 
incapacitated. These documents derive their moral authority from the notion that treating a 
patient according to their known capable preferences is to respect their autonomy. But when they 
are needed, such as when a person is unconscious and on a ventilator, surrogates often dispute 
their accuracy, testifying to medical staff that the patient changed her mind or that she lacked the 
capacity to make rational decisions when composing the directive. Such claims may sometimes 
be correct. But advanced directives also function to reduce the epistemic burdens of surrogate 
decision-makers. In the case of disputed directives, there are two options: pursue the veracity of 
the claim that the directive is unreliable or do what the directive says. There is little or no 
epistemic burden in doing what the directive says. However, investigating the veracity of the 
claim that the directive is unreliable is relatively epistemically burdensome, perhaps significantly 
so. To pursue this option, the surrogate must do other things to repair her ignorance of the 
patient’s preferences. The relative burdens of the two options shape the incentives of these 
options and, thus, serve to determine the option that the surrogate pursues. 
 
EXPLANATION  
 
It is widely recognized that patient surrogates face epistemic burdens. We claim something 
stronger: these burdens structure and shape the patient surrogate’s incentives in a way that 
significantly affects the treatment options she pursues. Making a surrogate medical decision is 
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not simply a matter of substituting one person’s judgment for another’s, it is also a matter of the 
knowledge which informs a surrogate’s judgment. That epistemic burdens shape incentives and, 
thus, decisions, is a feature of all decision-making, personal and surrogate.9 The unique 
epistemology of surrogate decision-making only makes this feature more obvious. In this section, 
we offer two complementary and mutually reinforcing explanations for the fact that the 
significance of epistemic burdens is more apparent in surrogate cases. That the phenomenon can 
be explained is further evidence that it is a real feature of surrogate decision-making. 
 First, the philosophical explanation. We all have preferences and beliefs about these 
preferences. In most cases, one’s own belief that one has a preference for X is a confident belief. 
One’s own credence that one wants a cup of coffee is typically very high. This higher-order 
belief—a belief about another mental state—has a high credence. In determining whether one 
wants a cup of coffee, the epistemic burden is very low. One needs only to introspect to 
overcome this burden. However, suppose that one is wondering about whether a friend wants a 
cup of coffee. The credence in the belief that one’s friend wants a cup of coffee will be 
significantly lower. That is, one’s confidence in the belief that one’s friend wants a cup of coffee 
will be less than one’s confidence that one wants a cup of coffee. To equalize the credences of 
the two higher-order beliefs, more is required of the belief about one’s friend’s preference for a 
cup of coffee. There is additional epistemic work to do. One must do things like ask whether the 
friend wants a cup of coffee or otherwise collect further evidence for or against the proposition. 
This is more burdensome than the mere introspection required to discover one’s own 
preferences. This relation between higher-order beliefs about lower-order preferences generalizes 
                                                        
9 Decisions follow the path of least epistemic resistance in the case of personal decisions, also. 
Suppose that a physician gives you two treatment options, but you are uncertain which option 
best serves your own interests. Our claim is that, other things being equal, the option you pursue 
will be the one that imposes the lowest epistemic burden—the option about which your 
ignorance is most easily repaired. 
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to any surrogate decision. Relative to a lower-order preference for X, the epistemic burden of 
believing that another person has a preference for X will be greater than believing that one has a 
preference for X, because the credence of the belief in another person’s preference for X is lower 
than the credence of the belief in one’s own preference for X. This is why surrogate decisions are 
especially epistemically burdensome—more is required to bring the credence of the higher-order 
belief up to a degree that is sufficiently high to guide action. 
 Second, the psychological explanation. Epistemic burdens influence incentives in all 
cases, including in cases of personal decision-making where one decides for oneself. However, 
with respect to personal decision-making, much of this influence is experienced only sub-
consciously. The options from which we consciously choose have already been pre-processed for 
epistemic considerations on a less-than-fully conscious level. This is easily recognized in the fact 
that, when deciding for oneself, no one includes options that they consider impossible among the 
array of possibilities from which they ultimately make some choice (e.g., non-bakers do not 
consider baking bread an option given some flour, water, salt, and yeast). However, in cases of 
surrogate decision-making, the options are not automatically pre-processed for the decision-
maker’s ignorance. A sane person will never leave himself an epistemically impossible option 
(e.g., spontaneously learn Sanskrit) and will pre-discount epistemically difficult options 
accordingly, but there is no such guarantee in surrogate cases.10 You are never going to give 
yourself a goal that you cannot know enough to achieve, but somebody else might give you such 
a goal. You would never set for yourself the goal of spontaneously learning Sanskrit, but your 
friend surrounded by sharks might impose it upon you. If our argument here is sound, you will 
ignore this request. 
                                                        
10 An option judged to be impossible is ipso facto judged to be epistemically impossible, i.e., to 
bear an infinitely heavy epistemic burden. 
 22 
 Consider these explanations in the context of surrogate decision-making. For example, it 
often happens in acute care hospitals that even though a patient is incapable of making her own 
medical decisions, her family will agree that she has expressed a preference not to be intubated. 
They might further agree that the patient would want to be resuscitated in the event of cardiac 
arrest. However, respecting the first interest often requires violating the second and vice versa. 
Assuming the relevant attitudes accurately reflect the patient’s preferences, she has left her 
surrogates an epistemically impossible task. The surrogate’s credences about her beliefs 
concerning the patient’s preferences are likely to be quite low. If the decision concerned her own 
medical treatment, such a conflict could be easily resolved via introspection and rational 
deliberation. But this method is not available when the surrogate has inherited the conflict from 
the patient. To decide on behalf of the patient, the surrogate must resolve the conflict by raising 
the credence of either her belief that the patient’s preference for avoiding intubation outweighs 
the patient’s preference for being resuscitated following cardiac arrest or the contrary belief. The 
surrogate confronts a unique epistemic burden merely in virtue of being a surrogate. Our claim is 
that, if other factors are not equal across options, the relative weight of the epistemic burdens of 
competing options will partly determine, and, if other things are equal, fully determine, which 
option the surrogate ultimately pursues.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 It can be difficult to discover what another person wants and how to achieve these 
preferences. The weight of this challenge serves to determine the option that the surrogate 
pursues. This is not a prescription or a guide to surrogate decision-making—it is a glimpse of the 
structure of these decisions. That surrogate decisions are structured this way is a feature of our 
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own psychology, and of how we evaluate preferences and beliefs about preferences. That 
surrogate decisions flow around the path of least epistemic resistance is not something we can 
change or avoid. But recognizing this fact helps explain how and why surrogates make the 
decisions that they do. 
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